This extension of the rational voter model differs from prior studies in three ways: its adoption of aggregate voting data; its use of data that are non-demographic in nature; and its use of data that are time series rather than cross section. The study finds that the aggregate voter participation rate is higher when the public strongly approves of the President's job performance. Aggregate voter turnout also is increased by the opportunity to participate in a Presidential election. It also appears that a highly unpopular or controversial war increases voter turnout. By contrast, it also is found that voter turnout decreases in the face of a scandal involving the President. Finally, the greater the per capita real disposable income of the American public, the lower the aggregate voter participation rate, presumably due to opportunity cost considerations.
Introduction
Many economists, political scientists, policymakers, journalists, and others have long been intrigued by and have long been attempting to resolve the problems that are encountered, within a democratic process and system, in inducing voters to reveal their true preferences for public and quasi-public goods and services. Explaining the so-called "paradox of voting" has occupied the minds and efforts of numerous scholars. Participating in the election of public officials (voting) and expressing preferences (voting) for a variety of referenda on a wide range of issues is a fundamental component of the determination of the magnitude and form of government outlay (and tax) decisions and hence plays a significant role in efficient societal resource allocation. The perception that the voter participation rate in the U.S. is not only low relative to the other industrialized democratic nations but also has even been in a state of modest decline, albeit erratically so, during the last several decades therefore is an issue of increasing concern.
Since Downs (1957) first introduced the theory of the "rational voter," there have followed numerous and varied theoretical extensions and empirical studies to enhance, test, and better understand the theory or variants thereof in a variety of both "real world" and "experimental" contexts [e.g., Tullock (1967) , Buchanan (1968) , Riker and Ordeshook (1968) , Brazel and Silberberg (1973) , Ashenfelter and Kelly (1975) , Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) , Kafoglis and Cebula (1981) , Cebula and Kafoglis (1983) , Ledyard (1984) , Aldrich and Simon (1986) , Morton (1987) , Piven and Cloward (1988) , Cox and Munger (1989) , Morton (1991) , Teixeira (1992) , Aldrich (1993) , Green and Shapiro (1994) , Green and Shapiro (1994) , Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) , Leighly (1996) , Lapp (1999) , Greene and Nikolaw (1999) , Knack (1999) , Matsusaka and Palda (1999) , Putnam (2000) , Cebula (2001) , Copeland and LaBand (2002) , Mueller (2003) , Barreto, Segura and Woods (2004) , Cebula (2004) , Borgers (2004) , and Feddersen (2004) ].
The complexity of voting behavior is perhaps best exemplified in the work by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) , which itself has been the subject of extensive attention and examination.
Moreover, the possibility of voting in alternative ways, such as "voting with one's feet," is exemplified by the work of Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971) , among others. The hypothesis of "voting by tax evasion" has been introduced by Cebula (2003) , whereas Copeland and LaBand (2002) , Cebula (2004) , and in a limited sense, Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004) , have empirically investigated a theory of "expressive voting." To some extent, Cebula (2003) and Copeland and Laband (2002) , respectively, reflect efforts to identify non-traditional ways in which to vote vicariously and/or to introduce non-traditional or non-demographic variables that may explain voting behavior. Interestingly, the study by Copeland and Laband (2002) may do more to identify the characteristics of people most likely to vote than it does to explain why eligible voters decide whether to vote or not vote per se.
As a rough generalization, voting is high, frequently 95 percent or more, when elections are first introduced. On the whole, it tends to fall off as people become more and more accustomed and perhaps bored by the election process. There are exceptions in this rule, Norway for example. Nonvoters pay a small fine in Australia, which may lead to a lower level of information for the average voter. Some uninterested voters vote only to avoid the fine.
Some uninterested voters may be confused by the use of the Hare method of proportional representation, Concern regarding low as well as declining voter participation rates in the U.S. is expressed frequently in the media and elsewhere. As observed by Putnam (2000, p. 31) , 'With the singular exception of voting, American rates of political participation compare favorably with those in other democracies... ' Putnam (2000, p. 31) observes that 'We are reminded each election year that fewer voters show up at the polls in America than in most other democracies… ' Putnam (2000, p. 32) proceeds to observe that 'Turnout has declined despite the fact that the most commonly cited barrier to voting ["burdensome registration requirements"] has been substantially lowered.'
Because election outcomes can have very profound implications for societal and government resource allocations, the underlying free-rider problem in voting may carry a huge price tag. The size of government outlays generally and the specific directions in which public expenditures are directed influence the well being of the society as a whole, both in the short run and the long run. So, "What determines voter participation, or the lack of it, in the U.S.?" And.
"Why are voter participation rates in the U.S. declining?" Once there is a better understanding of the answers to these questions, perhaps there will also be a better answer (or better answers) to the question "How can the U.S. voter participation rate be increased?" There are people, of course, who do not think that increasing the number of voters is a desirable objective. After all the nonvoters are less likely to be deeply interested and well-informed about the voting issues.
Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to investigate empirically the determinants of the aggregate voter participation rate in the U.S. in a framework that is broader and hopefully more useful than previous empirical analyses of voter turnout and the rational voter framework. The focus in this study is on the perspective that the decision as to whether or not to vote may involve 'Rational, self-interested individuals [who] [Copeland and Laband (2002, p. 351) ] as to whether their individual votes will "count," i.e., make a difference in the (an) election outcome. For example, it is argued here that a factor such as strong public approval of the incumbent President per se may increase voter turnout. Indeed, it is argued in this study that this factor, along with such other factors as enthusiasm over the Presidential nomination and election process, the Vietnam War (or perhaps in principle any protracted, unpopular or controversial war), and the public's disillusionment with the election/voting process as a consequence of the Watergate scandal, along with the public's own economic well being (prosperity) may combine to significantly affect voter turnout and hence the election of public officials whose decisions largely determine the allocation of public funds to the myriad forms of public outlay options that exist. Expressed somewhat differently, this study seeks to empirically investigate the determinants of aggregate voter participation rates over time in a fashion that includes macro-level, time-series variables that can potentially be viewed as eliciting "expressive voting/non-voting" or "emotional voting/non-voting" by eligible voters as a whole.
The framework
Typically, studies of the rational voter model for the U.S. have employed cross-section data to determine the predictive capacity of various demographic and election-specific factors on voter participation. Unfortunately, most of these studies have failed to produce robust empirical support for the hypothesis. One of the arguably more comprehensive of these studies, that by Matsusaka and Palda (1999) , adopts nearly 40 variables in a cross-section analysis of voting behavior in an effort to quantify the extent to which voter turnout can be explained. However, despite the large number of right-hand-side variables considered, this study collectively explains only about 15 percent of voter turnout. Matsusaka and Palda (1999, p. 442) conclude that '…most of the inability to predict who votes appears to come from non-stationary factors.' Matsusaka and Palda (1999) proceed to suggest two possible paths for future research. The first is to search for non-demographic variables. This suggestion is echoed and pursued in the more recent study using LOGIT techniques on micro cross-section data for even numbered years from 1986-1996 by Copeland and Laband (2002) . The second suggestion is to adopt aggregated voting data, which might allow the estimations of models with greater explanatory power, as in Cebula (2001) . Finally, in a related study, Greene and Nickolaw (1999, p. 224 ) argue that 'cross-section results…do not control for time,' suggesting then that the use of time series may be a more fruitful avenue to pursue in order to explain voter turnout behavior. It should be observed that all three of these suggestions are adopted in the present study.
Paralleling the rational voter model, it is hypothesized in the present study that the probability that a given eligible voter will actually vote, PROBV, is an increasing function of the expected gross benefits (EGB) associated with voting, ceteris paribus, and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs (EGC) associated with voting, ceteris paribus. Thus, it follows that:
In interpreting EGB and EGC, this study argues that these concepts require a very broad, encompassing interpretation. For instance, in most major elections, the marginal probability that one vote will make the (a) difference is approximately zero. Nevertheless, certain circumstances or factors can potentially increase the expected benefits from voting. For example, when there is an issue (be it economic or non-economic in nature) that an eligible voter feels particularly strongly about, voting may provide subjective benefits to the would-be voter because it has served as an emotional release or outlet. That release may consist of expressing either approval or disapproval regarding the particular issue in question. From a different perspective, in some cases citizens who vote may take great personal pride in doing so and thusly derive subjective benefits because they feel they have fulfilled an important "civic duty." Alternatively, certain circumstances can potentially reduce the expected benefits from voting. For instance, if a circumstance makes one feel disenfranchised from the government (and/or the election process), e.g., if a would-be eligible voter feels that his/her elected officials may (are likely to) betray them, the would-be voter is discouraged and shies away from "wasting" his/her time and effort bothering to vote. Naturally, there also are factors that can influence the expected costs of voting, broadly interpreted as including opportunity costs. Accordingly, this study proceeds with the notion that the decision to vote or not to vote can be impacted profoundly by a host of varying, often subjective, but nonetheless powerful circumstances. This study claims to have in fact identified a number of these factors and to have thusly extended the rational voter context so that it more satisfactorily and more extensively explains the actual aggregate voter participation rate.
The analysis commences with a question/hypothesis that has never been empirically tested in the literature prior to this study. In particular, "Does the voter participation rate increase when voters strongly approve of the perceived job performance of the incumbent President?" To begin, it is observed that the public's approval rating of the U.S. President (PRESAPP) has for decades been measured scientifically, adopting sound intertemporally comparable polling methodologies. The present study considers the time period 1960-2000. Over this 41year period, the mean public approval rating of the sitting President was 48.13 out of a possible 100.0, with a standard deviation of 8.78. It is hypothesized here that the public has a greater incentive to vote, particularly during Presidential election years, when eligible voters are especially pleased with (i.e., strongly approve of) the incumbent President's job performance. In other words, voting allows the voters to express their positive feelings towards the President; therefore, voting provides voters the opportunity to derive subjective satisfaction (benefits) from expressing feelings. Accordingly, it is hypothesized here that the greater the public approval rating of the incumbent President/Administration, the greater the voter participation rate, ceteris paribus.
It is also hypothesized that Presidential elections offer an opportunity for individual eligible voters to vote for a potentially very powerful and important policymaker (the President of the U.S.) in conjunction with voting for numerous other candidates for public office, not to mention a variety of referenda. Thus, during Presidential election years (PRESDUM), a given trip to the ballot box provides this additional potentially very important opportunity (voting for the Presidency) at approximately zero marginal cost and hence provides an added incentive to vote. Reasonably, the prospect of voting in such an important election also tends to invoke a high degree of emotional enthusiasm typically missing in most other election years [Copeland and Laband (2002) Arguably, the idea that a President of the U.S. could have been culpable of effectively attempting to control the choice of Presidential nominee of the opposing party and to interfere with and indeed corrupt the process by which the U.S. President was to be elected, undoubtedly for many Americans represented a form of betrayal. The election process came under question, i.e., for at least some of the electorate the value of voting came into doubt. Clearly, the effects of the events surrounding the Watergate scandal, for many Americans, meant that the expected benefits of voting were seriously diminished. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the Watergate scandal led to a decline in the voter participation rate, ceteris paribus.
It is also hypothesized that the more prosperous the economy is, e.g., the higher is the public's real disposable income (PCRDI), the greater the opportunity cost of voting. Indeed, if the public is becoming increasingly prosperous, they may not wish to take the time to vote, and instead prefer to use the time to continue "earning," i.e., enhancing their economic well being and pursuing ambitions. Alternatively, the public simply might prefer to use the time to enjoy the fruits of their increased prosperity. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the expected cost of voting rises as the pool of eligible voters becomes increasingly prosperous, ceteris paribus.
Based on the framework outlined above, it follows that equation (1) Table B -31). The data for the Presidential approval rating were obtained from:
http://www.geocities.com/americanpresidencynet/approval.htm
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests both confirm that the series for variable PCRDIt-1 is stationary only in first differences. Hence, in the estimations provided below, the variable PCRDIt-1 is expressed in first differences. The series for the variable PRESAPPt-1 was found to be stationary in levels. Finally, the VPRt series was found to be stationary in levels with a trend variable; consequently, a linear trend variable (TREND) is included in the model estimations.
Empirical findings
Estimating equation (2) by ordinary least squares (OLS), using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction, yields the following: 
where terms in parentheses are t-values and ∆ is the first differences operator. In equation (3), all the six of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with four statistically significant at the one percent level and a further two statistically significant at beyond the five percent level.
The coefficient of determination (R 2 or adjusted R 2 ) indicates that the model explains effectively 98 percent of the variation in the dependent variable, which far exceeds the explanatory power of any other published study to date. Finally, the F-ratio is statistically significant at far beyond the one percent level.
The estimated coefficient in equation (3) on the PRESAPP variable is positive and significant at the three percent level. This finding suggests, as hypothesized earlier in this study, that when the public strongly approves of the job performance of the incumbent President, they turn out in greater numbers than otherwise would be the case in order to express that strong approval. Voting becomes a vehicle for expressing positive feelings toward the President and his job performance; conversely of course, when the President's approval rating is low, lower voter turnout is observed.
The estimated coefficient in equation (3) on the PRESDUM variable is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. This evidence confirms the hypothesis proffered above that voter participation rates increase during Presidential election years, when the outcome of the election is perceived as more important, so that the potential benefits from voting are greater while presumably reflecting emotions ranging from simple enthusiasm, perhaps almost reminiscent of "cheerleading" [Copeland and Laband (2002) , Cebula (2004) , Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004) ] to stronger emotional responses to the candidates themselves, the party platforms and/or the candidates' positions on sensitive issues such as abortion, the environment, affirmative action, terrorism, same-sex marriage and the Middle East.
The coefficient on the VIETNAM variable is positive, as expected, and significant at the one percent level. This finding may be interpreted as suggesting a strong emotional pull by the "war" issue of voters to the polling booths, perhaps in the hope of creating a change in U.S.
policy regarding military involvement in Vietnam. The documented unpopularity of the Vietnam War, along with intense controversy over the War, appears to have led to increasing voter participation. The lesson from these findings may be that protracted "unpopular" wars are likely to induce increased voter participation and, arguably, voting patterns that are of a nature that is likely to be, on balance, at least somewhat anti-incumbent. Clearly, the absence of a protracted unpopular and/or controversial war may then reduce the voter participation rate.
The coefficient on the variable WATERGATE is negative, as expected, and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the Watergate scandal acted to discourage voter participation. Presumably, the role of President Nixon in the Watergate scandal, especially given the alleged objective of affecting a Presidential election outcome, reduced the expected benefits from voting. Arguably, the Watergate scandal created a degree of cynicism among many U.S.
voters and quashed their interest in the electoral process.
The coefficient on the PCRDI variable in equation (3) is negative and significant at the one percent level. This result suggests strongly that the higher the per capita disposable real income among the U.S. electorate, the greater the opportunity cost (expected gross costs) of voting. Consequently, the voter participation rate is reduced by this prosperity. Ironically, that very same prosperity is likely placed in greater long run jeopardy when eligible voters decide against exercising their right to vote in a democratic society.
To demonstrate the robustness of the framework presented in this study as well as the robustness of the empirical results provided in equation (3), a second estimate of the basic model, one that drops the least statistically significant variable in that estimate (PRESAPP) from the system, is provided in equation (4). The OLS estimation in equation (4) 
Conclusion
This study has endeavored to broaden the rational voter model context so as to improve understanding of voter participation rate determinants in the U.S. and, implicitly, so as to improve forecasting of and promote higher levels of voter participation. Alternatively stated, perhaps the insights into voting decision determinants provided in this study will help to enhance the ability to increase the aggregate voter participation rate.
In any case, using aggregate time series covering the period 1960-2000, this study has obtained several significant results. First, the voter participation rate tends to be higher, by roughly 2.4 percentage points [according to estimation (3)], when the public strongly approves of the job performance of the incumbent President. This finding is unique in this literature. Second, the opportunity to vote for the office of President, i.e., in a Presidential election year, acts to elevate the voter participation rate, perhaps by as many as 13-14 points. In principle, this finding comes as no surprise [e.g., Copeland and Laband (2002) ], although the magnitude of the effect is quite impressive. Third, the Watergate scandal discouraged the electorate sufficiently to reduce the voter participation rate, perhaps by as many as six to seven percentage points. This is a very significant finding, especially given the gradually declining voter participation rate since 1960.
Fourth, the Vietnam War had a positive and statistically significant impact on voter participation, apparently between one and two percentage points. This issue may to some extent have 16 galvanized an otherwise somewhat free-riding, somewhat apathetic public into a voter coalition with a somewhat greater propensity to vote in order to promote a specific agenda. This finding may be capable of being generalized into a rule of thumb by which it is possible to conjecture that any unpopular war, particularly a protracted one, might well act to elicit a greater voter turnout and perhaps even result in the election of a new Administration. Finally, the greater the per capita real disposable income of the U.S. electorate, the lower the aggregate voter participation rate, ceteris paribus, arguably because the opportunity cost to voting (in the short run) is rising. Apparently, the very prosperity that has evolved in this democratic system may endanger its long run future as the free rider problem proceeds unabated.
